Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina SUSAN C. STOKES Yale University Political machines (or clientelist parties) mobilize electoral support by trading particularistic benefits to voters in exchange for their votes. But if the secret ballot hides voters' actions from the machine, voters are able to renege, accepting benefits and then voting as they choose. To explain how machine politics works, I observe that machines use their deep insertion into voters' social networks to try to circumvent the secret ballot and infer individuals' votes. When parties influence how people vote by threatening to punish them for voting for another party, I call this perverse accountability. I analyze the strategic interaction between machines and voters as an iterated prisoners' dilemma game with one-sided uncertainty. The game generates hypotheses about the impact of the machine's capacity to monitor voters, and of voters' incomes and ideological stances, on the effectiveness of machine politics. I test these hypotheses with data from Argentina.
Thirty-five years ago, James Scott (1969) observed that political life of contemporary new nations bore a strong resemblance to the machine politics of the United States in earlier eras. The patronage, particularism, and graft endemic to the Philippines or Malaysia in the postwar decades recalled, for Scott, the Tweed machine in nineteenth-century New York or the Dawson machine in twentieth-century Chicago. Much has happened in the third of a century since Scott outlined "the contours and dynamics of the 'machine model' in comparative perspective" (1143). Many of the new nations that occupied his analysis have undergone transitions to electoral democracy; yet politics in these systems often remains particularistic, clientelistic, and corrupt. We therefore have a larger sample of countries, and a richer experience on which to draw, to understand the contours and dynamics of the machine. The historiography of the U.S. political machine has also grown, as have historical studies of patronage and vote buying in the history of today's advanced European democracies (see, e.g., Piattoni 2001) . Finally, a formal literature on redistributive politics has developed, one in which the political machine plays a central role.
Yet the formal literature on the political machine leaves some crucial questions unanswered. Chief among them: How does the machine keep voters from reneging on the implicit deal whereby the machine distributes goods and the recipient votes for the machine? If voters can renege, then machines should not waste scarce resources on them and clientelist politics breaks down. The question is the more pressing, given that many of the societies in which we find active political machines also have the secret ballot. Political machines did not disappear in the United States after the introduction of the Australian ballot in most U.S. states at the end of the nineteenth century.1 And clientelism flourishes in countries from Mexico (Fox 1994) to Italy (Chubb 1982) to Bulgaria (Kitschelt et al. 1999 ), all of which have the ballot.
Assuming that machines can overcome the problem of their clients' reneging, what kinds of voters will they target? Scattered through the qualitative literature is evidence that poor voters are the targets of machines (see, e.g., Chubb 1982; Wilson and Banfield 1963) . Formal treatments agree, citing diminishing marginal utility of income as the reason why particularlistic benefits generate more votes among the poor than the rich (Calvo and Murillo 2004; Dixit and Londregan 1996) . Yet in the societies where clientelistic parties or machines are active, not all poor voters receive benefits. Limited resources force political machines to choose among poor voters. Machine operatives everywhere face a version of the dilemma that an Argentine Peronist explains. About 40 voters live in her neighborhood, and her responsibility is to get them to the polls and get them to vote for her party. But the party gives her only 10 bags of food to distribute, "ten little bags," she laments, "nothing more."2 How does she, and machine operatives like her in systems around the world, decide who among her neighbors shall and who shall not receive handouts?
The formal literature answers this question by saying that machines target core constituents. But if these constituents are ideologically committed to the machine, is it not wasting resources if it distributes rewards to them? Would it not do better by distributing rewards to the uncommitted or even to those who, on ideological 1 The Australian ballot is one in that is produced by governments or neutral election authorities (rather than by political parties), distributed through guarded channels on or close to election day, and that lists all parties or candidates for an office in a single format. grounds, oppose the party? The selection method of our Argentine operative is to help "the people who complain the most, the ones who say, 'What are you going to give me?' I pick them up [to take them to the polls] and after I take them they say, 'Aren't there any bags of food?"' Her words hint at a logic in which machines give private handouts not to die-hard supporters but to people whose future support is in doubt. The analysis in this article helps make sense of her explanation.
Far from being just a Latin American problem, or a problem that advanced democracies have completely overcome, vote buying, clientelism, and machine politics are blights on many democracies around the world, even today. and to provide public goods, keeps voters from using elections to express their policy preferences, and undermines voter autonomy (see Karlan 1994; Kochin and Kochin 1998; O'Donnell 1996; Stokes 2004) . To overcome perverse accountability, we need first to understand how machine politics works. This article begins to build such an understanding.
STATIC MODELS OF REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS AND THE COMMITMENT

PROBLEM
In some of our leading formal models of redistributive politics, the political machine plays a large role. Dixit and Londregan (1996) For Cox and McCubbins (1986) , the crucial feature of the machine-core constituent link is that the party is more certain about how core groups will respond to rewards than it is about other groups. The party is more certain because "core supporters... are wellknown quantities. The candidate is in frequent and intensive contact with them and has relatively precise and accurate ideas about how they will react" (1986, .
The problem with both pairs of authors' models is that they don't deal adequately with commitment problems. Both assume by caveat that the party won't renege on its offer of particularistic rewards once it's won the election. The assumption that machines can hold voters accountable, that they can monitor individuals' votes (even if imperfectly) and make rewards contingent on the voter's support, departs from the implicit assumption of redistributive theorists. They assume that a member of a favored group will receive private rewards whether or not he votes for the party; individual voters are anonymous and therefore free from the party's retribution should they defect. The premise that voting is a private and anonymous act may have discouraged formal theorists from modeling these interactions as repeated games; repeated games generally rely on each player being able to observe the actions of the other in the previous round. The assumption that voting is anonymous is appropriate in most advanced democracies, but not necessarily in the historical context of political machines or in many new democracies today.6
There are two kinds of private information about the voter that are useful to the party: his actions-which party he votes for-and his type-his partisan predisposition in relation to the two parties. Machines are good at gathering information about voters' actions and types. Indeed, formal theorists have identified features of the machine that makes it good at discerning what people need and delivering it to them efficiently, but these same features also make it good at discerning individuals' likely votes.
Certain voting technologies allow parties to monitor individuals' votes. The recent historiography of U.S. machines deepens our appreciation of these technologies. Until the introduction of the Australian ballot in the United States, in most states in 1891, parties produced "ticket" or "coupon" ballots, ones that listed only their candidates. To monitor which party's ballot the voter was using, parties printed ballots on paper of different weights or colors. Voters deposited the ballot directly in the ballot box, under the watchful eye of party operatives, without first concealing it in an envelope (for descriptions, see Keyssar 2000; Reynolds 1988 ). Reynolds (1980, 193) reports that New Jersey's early automatic voting machines, introduced in 1890, made clicking noises that allowed party officials standing nearby to detect the voter's selection. And operatives from the Philadelphia Republican party in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century offered to fill out ballots on voters' behalf (McCaffery 1993).
Voting practices and technologies undermine the anonymity of the vote in contemporary developing democracies, as they did in U.S. machine cities, even where the Australian ballot is in use and where voting is, in a narrow sense, secret. In her description of contemporary India as a "patronage democracy," Chandra 6 It is not always appropriate for advanced democracies. In contem- Certain party-organizational structures allow parties to discern individual voters' types-their predisposition for or against the machine. The typical political machine (or clientelist party) is bottom-heavy, decentralized, and relies on an army of grassroots militants. Voters in today's democracies in the developing world are frequently geographically immobile, living in neighborhoods where they grew up and where family members and close acquaintances live. Some of these familiar neighbors work as operatives for political parties. They therefore know much about an individual that shapes his partisan attachments: his job, associational membership, parents' ideological inclinations, and public statements about parties and policies. It is also hard for voters to dissemble before people they've known all their lives: as one grassroots party organizer in Argentina explained, you know if a neighbor voted against your party if he can't look you in the eye on election day.
Information about individual voters' partisan predispositions helps the machine make inferences about how individuals vote and whether they are good candidates for vote buying. For instance, the model in the next section shows that voters who are predisposed in favor of the machine on partisan or programmatic grounds cannot credibly threaten to punish their favored party if it withholds rewards. Therefore the party should not waste rewards on them. The model also
shows that voters who are strongly opposed to the machine will not trade their votes for rewards. A machine can compensate, to some degree, for an effective secret ballot if it can distinguish strong opponents from people who oppose it more moderately, or strong loyalists from people who are indifferent about whom to vote for.
Argentina, the country from which I present evidence, combines a balloting system that gives parties greater control over voters than does the Australian ballot, a social structure of reduced anonymity, especially among the poor, and party organizations that help parties monitor voters. These features contribute to a widespread perception among Argentine voters and party operatives that voting is a less than fully anonymous act. As one grassroots party organizer explained, "Anyone who's militating in the streets, you know who's with you and who's not with you."8 In a survey conducted in four Argentine provinces in JulyAugust 2003, respondents were asked, "Even though the vote is secret, do you believe that party operatives can find out how a person in your neighborhood has voted?" Despite a technically secret ballot, 37% of the sample responded that party operatives can find out, 51% that they cannot, and the remaining 12% didn't know (total sample size: 2,000).9 This perception was echoed in an interview with a couple from a small city in the Argentine province of C6rdoba:
Husband: Here it's different than in C6rdoba [the nearest big city]. Here they know everyone. And they know whom everyone is going to vote for. Author: When people come and give things out during the campaign, are they people whom you know? Husband: Yes, they're people from here, they're neighbors. Here everyone knows each other. "Small town, big hell." (Pueblo chico, infierno grande.) Author: Do they know how you voted? Husband: For many years we've seen, people will say, "So-and-so voted for so-and-so." And he wins, and they come and say, "You voted for so-and-so." I don't know how they do it, but they know. Voting technologies in Argentina also reduce the anonymity of the vote. Argentina has the secret but not the Australian ballot.11 Argentines vote with slips of paper that carry the names only of a given party's candidates, like the coupon ballots used in the nineteenthcentury United States. People can vote with ballots that they receive directly from party operatives. Or they can vote with ballots supplied inside the voting booth. People tend to receive ballots as part of a process of direct, face-to-face mobilization.
The practice of handing out ballots basically serves as a method of monitoring and influencing how people vote. One Peronist organizer explained in an interview how the party used the ballots. "The most important thing is to go look for people and give them the ballot. You give them the ballot in the taxi [which the party has hired to transport them to the polls]. Then no one has time to change their ballots for them [i.e., give them a different ballot. After taking voters into the polling place] you put them on line to vote... Then they don't have a chance to change the ballot. Only if they're really sneaky and they change it inside the voting booth."12
In sum, my first assumption is that machines can effectively, if imperfectly, monitor the actions of their constituents.
A second assumption needed to model machine politics as a repeated game is that all players foresee the game continuing into the future. It is entirely appropriate to think of the interactions between machine operatives and their constituents as repeated over many iterations; the more artificial assumption would be that these are one-shot or short-lived interactions. Ma- When parties that are not enmeshed in social networks try to buy votes with private inducements, voters greet their efforts with skepticism. In connection with research I conducted in Lima, Peru, I observed the reactions of people in a working-class neighborhood to a soup kitchen that a political party established in 1985, shortly before national elections (see Stokes, 1995) . Soup kitchens were familiar in the neighborhood: Catholic activists and women's organizations ran some and the local mayor's office supported them. But when residents saw an outsider party set up a soup kitchen they predicted that it would disappear after election day. They were unmoved by the sponsorparty's implicit appeal for electoral support. And they were right: the soup kitchen did disappear right after the election.
In the Argentine case, furthermore, it is appropriate to assume that parties and voters see their interaction as extending into the indefinite future; even if they could imagine hypothetical circumstances in which it might end (in the event, e.g., of a military coup), at the time of any given election since the return to democracy in that country, few would have anticipated a particular moment when it would end. The perception of an interaction with no identifiable stopping point makes it reasonable to model this as an infinitely repeated game.
To capture the repeated-play dynamic of machine politics, it is necessary to depart in a third way from received models of redistributive politics. These models assume that the machine's ability to reward voters for their support depends on its winning elections.13 A voter whose support will only be rewarded if the machine wins anticipates that the game in effect ends each time the machine loses. Many machines, such as (Chubb 1982) , face negligible competition. Because the machine effectively cannot lose, voters anticipate that the game will continue. But other machines operate in settings where they can lose. Even in competitive settings, the game between machine and voter need not end when the machine finds itself in opposition. It does not end if the machine can carry over public funds from the party's time in power, or if it can make use of resources donated by private actors, private actors who expect policy concessions from the machine when it is back in power (Stigler 1975) . Note that two of the three longterm clientelist Latin American parties mentioned earlier, the Peronists and APRA, were more often in opposition than in power.
To summarize, my key assumptions are that machines can monitor voters' actions and that both sides foresee their interaction extending indefinitely into the future. The latter assumption implies that machines don't lose their ability to distribute goods when they find themselves in opposition. votes. Define voters for whom x* < x < x* + b/(x2 -xl) as Weakly opposed voters. Weakly opposed voters prefer to vote against the machine in the absence of a reward, but prefer to vote for the machine if doing so brings them a reward. If the value of the vote to the machine exceeds b, the machine and the Weakly opposed voter are in a prisoners' dilemma. Table 2 gives the game between a Weakly opposed voter and a machine, with simplified payoffs that make clear the prisoners'-dilemma structure of the game.
Next, I assume an infinite sequence of elections and model the interaction between the machine and a Weakly opposed voter as an iterated prisoners' dilemma with one-sided uncertainty.14 I also assume that the two are playing a grim-trigger strategy, whereby when one player defects, the other defects in all subsequent rounds. Aside from theoretical reasons in favor of the grim trigger, interviews with Argentine party operatives suggest that they in fact follow a strategy of this sort. For instance, we asked a Peronist organizer how she responded when she suspected that a person to whom she had extended favors voted for another party. She answered, "He's dead. He died, forever."15 Returning to the model, if the voter votes against the machine, I now assume, the machine observes the negative vote with a probability p. Voters discount the future by a discount factor /, which falls on the interval [0, 1]. The condition for a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) in which the Weakly opposed voter receives the 14 In a sense there is uncertainty on both sides, about whether the other will cooperate or defect in the future. This uncertainty characterizes all iterated prisoners' dilemmas-indeed, all repeated games-in which there is more than one equilibrium. I model this game as one of one-sided uncertainty because only the machine is uncertain about whether the voter has cooperated or defected. The voter, by contrast, observes perfectly whether the machine gives him a reward.
15 Interview conducted in January 2003 in the city of C6rdoba by Valeria Brusco, Marcelo Nazareno, and Susan Stokes. reward and votes for the machine, supported by a grim trigger strategy should the voter be observed to renege, Defect 4, 1 2, 2 X* < xi Ix*±x (bX2 Xi).
(2) Lambda falls on the [0, 1] interval. Lambda is an increasing function of the discount rate (/3) and of the probability of a defector being caught (p). If p = 0 (there is no possibility that the machine would observe a defection by the voter), or if /3= 0 (the voter cares nothing about future consumption), then inequality [2] reduces to xi = x*. In these cases the machine can buy the votes only of voters who are indifferent, on ideological grounds, between the parties.
Loyal voters do not meet the condition in [2] . As illustrated in Figure 2 , for Loyal voters xL < x*. Intuitively, Loyal voters who want to extract private rewards from their preferred party would, under the grim trigger, have to threaten to vote against the party forever if the machine denied them a reward once. Such a threat would lack credibility: the party knows that the Loyal voter, even without rewards, is better off cooperating forever than defecting forever.16 Nor 16 The loyal voter's diehard ideological commitment to the party allows the machine, in a sense, to exploit him, garnering his vote without having to spend scarce resources on him. Loyalists would 320
In other words, to sustain cooperation, the value to the voter in the current and all subsequent periods of voting for the machine and receiving a reward must equal or exceed the sum of the payoff from defecting in the current period plus (1) avoiding detection and returning to cooperation in the next and subsequent periods (with probability p), or (2) being caught and, in all subsequent periods, voting against the machine but foregoing rewards (with probability 1 -p).
Inequality [ Hence, the set of voters who would sell their votes in exchange for a private benefit is the set whose ideal point, xi, satisfies to voting for the machine in exchange for a gift; the machine knows that the voter is better off cooperating forever than defecting forever. In contrast to the Loyal voter, the threat to punish the machine by voting against it in the future by the Weakly opposed voters is credible: left to their own devices, this is their preferred course of action.
Inequality [2] implies four comparative statics:
* As the ideological distance between the two parties (x2 -x1) shrinks, the potential for vote buying grows. Intuitively, when the two parties are ideologically or programmatically close, there is less at stake for the voter in the decision of which to vote for, and the value of the private reward becomes more salient.
* As the value of the private reward (b) relative to the value of voting in accordance to one's policy or ideological preference increases, the potential for vote buying increases. The reward must be worth a lot to the voter. But its value to the machine must be less than the value of a single vote-not very much. This suggests that, given decreasing marginal utility from income, machines will target poor voters. * The more accurately the machine can monitor voters, the greater the potential for vote buying (X is an increasing function of p). This accuracy is a function of the technology for monitoring voters' actions and of the machine's organizational structure.
* Among its core constituents--those whom it can observe well-the machine is most effective when it targets Weakly opposed voters (for whom x* < xi 5 x* + X(b/x2 -X1)), rather than Loyal (xi < x*) or Opposition voters (xi > x* + b/(x2 -x1)) voters.
therefore have an incentive to masquerade as indifferent voters, a possibility that I do not model here. It might, however, be psychologically difficult for party enthusiasts to feign indifference. Note also that any ideological shift by the machine runs the risk of turning the loyalist into an indifferent or even an opposition voter. Machines would then have to consider the distribution of loyal voters and the additional resources that might be needed to retain their support, were it to consider a change in its ideological stance.
17 Their minmax payoffs are, for the machine, 0, and, for WO, -1/2(xwo -x2)2. Hence, the feasible and individually rational payoffs they will accept in repeated play include the cooperation payoffs of (v -b, -1/2(xwo -X1)2 + b). and one-quarter of low-income Peronist voters, said it did. We asked other questions meant to detect clientelism, such as whether the person had turned to a locally important political actor for help during the past year (Patron) and whether, if the head of their household lost his or her job, the family would turn to a party operative for help (Job).
MACHINE POLITICS AND VOTE
Poverty and Vote Buying
I discuss five pieces of evidence from the survey that lend support to my theory of machine politics. The first has to do with the effect of poverty on a voter's willingness to sell his or her vote. The formal model analyzed earlier predicts that vote buying is more easily sustained, all else equal, when the voter values the private reward relatively highly but the party values it relatively little. The picture this paints is of parties giving minor benefits to voters who are poor enough to value them highly-a picture consistent with much of the qualitative literature on machine and clientelist parties. To cite just one of many examples, Wilson and Banfield (1963) explain that U.S. machines operated in a city's "river wards," where working-class residents lived, but not in the "newspaper wards," where middleclass residents lived. Table 3 reports regression estimates of the likelihood of a clientelistic response to the set of questions discussed earlier, including whether the respondent received a private reward from a party. The negative and significant coefficients on Income, Education, and Housing quality variables show that poverty predicts clientelism. To illustrate the effect, the simulated expected probability that a wealthy person (one with the highest income, education, and housing-quality level) would have received a reward and acknowledged that it influenced her vote is 0.2%. The probability that a poor person (one with the lowest income, education, and housing-quality level) would have received a reward and allowed his or her vote to be influenced by it is 65 times greater: 13 %.21
In sum, political machines buy the votes of poor people in Argentina.
Monitoring Voters
Machine Organizational Structure. In the presence of the secret ballot, parties make inferences about how people vote by observing their type-where they fall on the dimension of programmatic support for the parties. A tentacle-like organizational structure is a great asset to parties in this regard. We know from a large secondary literature that the Argentine party with the organizational structure most like that of the machine is the Peronist party (see, e.g., Auyero 2000, and Levitsky 2003) . And our surveys indicate that the Peronist party was by far the most active in distributing private rewards. Eight hundred thirty-nine of our respondents said that a party distributed private rewards in their neighborhoods during the campaign; of these, 423 (50%) said that the Peronists distributed them.
The next most frequently mentioned party, the Radical Party, was mentioned by only 49 respondents.
21 All simulations reported in this section were executed with the Clarify program Wittenberg, 2000, and King, 2001) . Clarify draws simulations of parameters of statistical models (in this case, ordered logit regressions) from their sampling distribution and then converts these simulated parameters into expected values, such as expected probabilities of an answer to a survey question, given hypothetical values of explanatory variables. Clarify software and documentation are available from Gary King's web site at http://gking.harvard.edu. For this simulation I assumed a female Peronist supporter whose age and municipality size were average for the sample. Confidence intervals around the 0.2% expected probability were 0.05% and 0.5%, and around the 13% probability, 7% and 22%. (0.058) (0.037) (0.074) (0.070) (0.058) (0.035) (0.079) (0.073) quality ( Explanation of independent variables: Log population: natural log of population of respondent's municipality (2001 census). Ballot coded 1 for people who reported voting with a ballot given to them by a party operative, 0 for people who voted with a ballot they acquired in the voting booth. Peronist sympathizer, coded 1 for respondents who said they liked the Peronist Party more than others, 0 otherwise. Income: Self-reported by respondent, 9-level scale. Education: 9-level scale, from no formal education to postgraduate. Housing quality. Assessed by interviewer, 5-level scale (1 = poorest quality, 5 = highest quality). Gender female = 1. Radical sympathizer, coded 1 for respondents who said they liked the Radical Party more than others, 0 otherwise. Community Structure. The ease of monitoring is also influenced by the structure of communities where machines operate. We expect voters to be less anonymous, their partisan predispositions or types more a matter of public knowledge, in smaller towns and cities, where social relations are multifaceted and where, as one person we interviewed put it, "everyone knows each other."22 These are places where it is easier for parties to know 22 Interview conducted by Valeria Brusco, Lucas Lazaro, and Susan Stokes, July 2003. who's who, who is inclined toward one party or another, and how people are likely to have voted. And they are places where, as the same person explained, parties can use this information to "discriminate a little" when a defecting voter comes and "asks for a favor." It is reasonable, then, to treat community size as a proxy for observability of residents' votes.
In our surveys, the smaller the population size of the respondent's municipality, the more likely she or he was to have received rewards and to be responsive to them. These two effects are revealed in Table 3 by the negative and significant coefficients relating logged population size (as measured in the 2001 census) to Patron Reward and to Influence variables.23
The Technology of Voting. The last two findingsthat rewards are distributed by the party with the most machine-like structure, and that people in small towns and cities are more likely to receive, and to be responsive to, rewards-might be interpreted as simply showing that parties hand out rewards preferentially to people whom they can reach most efficiently. But I have argued that efficiency of distribution is just one side of the link between political machines and their constituents. The other side is perverse accountability: the machine's ability to hold voters accountable for their votes.
The fourth piece of evidence that I report goes directly to a party's ability to discern people's votes and to condition rewards on compliance. This evidence has to do with the technology of voting. Recall that Argentines vote with party-produced ballots, which they can acquire either directly from party operatives, as part of the process of face-to-face mobilization, or anonymously, in the voting booth. Ballot in Table 3 is a dummy variable for people who voted with ballots given to them by party operatives (15% of our sample). The positive and significant coefficient relating Ballot to Reward shows that people who vote with personally distributed ballots are more likely than others to receive rewards from parties, such as food or clothing. The positive and significant coefficient relating Ballot to Influence shows that people who receive personally distributed ballots are also more responsive to rewards.24 To give a sense of the magnitude of this effect, the simulated expected probability that a poor voter would allow his or her vote to be influenced by a reward, as we 23 Note that 90% of our interviews were with people who lived in cities with more than 10 thousand inhabitants. Thus, we interviewed few people who could be said to live in rural communities, and our population variable is best interpreted as distinguishing people according to the size of the urban area in which they lived.
24 The confidence intervals around the 7% figure are 4% and 12%.
An alternative interpretation is that parties, as a service, deliver ballots to the loyal partisans, who are more likely to vote for them anyway. In this case partisanship would "cause" both the hand delivery of the ballot and support for the party, and the apparent link between ballot delivery and support would be spurious. Yet this alternative explanation is inconsistent with the testimony of party operatives, who, like the one cited earlier, focus their ballot-delivery efforts on uncommitted or indifferent voters, ones who-they fear-might change the ballot in the voting booth. have seen, is 13%. This assumes that the voter received his or her ballot from a party operative. If we assume the same hypothetical poor voter voted with a ballot he or she finds in the voting booth, the probability is cut almost in half, to 7%.
In sum, in Argentina the more able a party is to monitor its constituents, the more effective its efforts at vote buying. The party with the most decentralized and tentacle-like organizational structure, hence the one best able to monitor the actions and types of its constituents, was the party that most actively attempted to buy votes. And the more observable the vote, either because the voter lives in a small community or because he or she receives the ballot directly from a party operative, the more likely he or she is to be the target of vote buying.
Types of Voters and Vote Buying
A fifth piece of evidence speaks to the question, What types of voters do machines pursue? My theoretical prediction was that machines focus their vote-buying efforts on people in the middle of the distribution of partisan predispositions: ones who are indifferent about whether to vote for or against the machine (XM = x*), and ones with a weak predisposition against it (x* < x < x* + b/(x2 -X1)). Machines will avoid voters who are loyalists or strong opponents.
We asked respondents their opinions of the Peronist party, Argentina's preeminent political machine.
We asked them to choose among "very good," "good," "bad," and "very bad" as their answers. Figure 3 displays the percentages of people who received or did not receive handouts by opinions of the Peronist party.
A striking finding, and one that conforms to the theoretical prediction, is the small proportion of those who rated the party "very good" who received rewards.
Three times as many people who did not receive rewards as those who did receive them rated the Peronists "very good" (31% vs. 10%). The Peronist party turned away from its strongest loyalists when it gave out private rewards. (The difference is all the more striking given that one might anticipate some endogeneity of perceptions of the party: people who receive rewards from it might be more prone, because of the gift, to the party "very good.") Another aspect of the findings that accords with my model's predictions is that many more people who rated the party "bad" received rewards than those who rated it "very bad."
In some ways, however, the findings do not accord with the predictions. Recipients of rewards were concentrated in the "Good" category: nearly 60% of those who received handouts from the Peronists saw it as a good party. These findings are inconsistent with the theory if we think of people who called the machine "good" as falling somewhat to the left of the median ideal point (x*) in Figure 2 and hence as being weakly predisposed in the machine's favor. Recall that, in theory, even voters just mildly predisposed in the machine's favor would not be able to credibly threaten to punish the machine if it defected and therefore would not, in repeated play, be able to induce the machine to pay them rewards. And we might have expected a relatively larger proportion of voters who rated the Peronists as "bad," and hence who were weakly opposed to it, to receive rewards. Similarly, note that the regression models in Table 3 show that, controlling for other factors, Peronist sympathizers were significantly more likely to receive rewards.
One explanation for the slippage between the theory and the evidence is that our survey did not offer people the option of indicating true indifference about the Peronists. Some people who chose the "good" option might in fact be closer to indifferent. And some people who were close to indifferent, prerewards, might have called the party "bad" but, because of the reward, been nudged into seeing it as "good."
The finding may also suggest a dynamic that goes beyond the model. Political machines organize by neighborhood and district, and they do more than just give out tactical rewards. They also proselytize. Although their proselytizing, in a competitive setting such as Argentina's, is not perfectly successful, to the extent that it is successful at all we expect the distribution of voter types in areas of machine organizational penetration to be skewed toward machine supporters, weak and strong. In other words, we expect organizational penetration by the party to increase not only the efficiency with which it distributes rewards and its ability to monitor voters, but also its partisan support (as Cox and McCubbins 1986 assume) . If organizational penetration increases partisan support, then the machine will target its supporters more than its opponents simply because it has greater access to them. Whatever the explanation for this anomaly, the evidence from Argentina does show unambiguously that, among core constituents, the machine discriminates against its most ardent supporters. the machines to compete for the same set of (ideologically) marginal voters. But competition between "dueling machines" seems, empirically, unusual. It is more common that, even in settings where politics is competitive at the macro level, parties have especially close links to particular groups of voters. And often one party specializes in machine-style politics, whereas another focuses on programmatic mobilization. This last point raises the question, If parties that are organized as machines can use minor payoffs to sway voters, why don't all parties organize themselves this way? A tentative answer is that parties face unequal costs of monitoring voters. Monitors are most effective when they live among the voters they are observing. Given residential segregation by income, parties with a middle-class base would have to employ middle-class monitors, who would require greater compensation than do the working-class operatives.
CONCLUSIONS
Parties with middle-class constituencies therefore are more effective when they advertise their programs, focusing resources on "air," rather than "ground,"
campaigns.
These limitations notwithstanding, we have made some headway. I have returned to Scott's insight that machine politics of old is a lot like clientelist politics of new. I have argued that the dynamics of machine or clientelist redistribution has only been half-understood in the literature, which has captured the delivery-ofservices but not the monitoring-of-voters side of the story. The literature thus misses the fact that machines are able to use their social proximity to voters to monitor their actions and types and hence to enforce the implicit redistributive contract. This insight allows us to model the strategic interactions between machines and constituents as repeated games.
